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A Framework for a
Distributed Key Management Scheme in
Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks
Kejie Lu, Yi Qian, Mohsen Guizani, and Hsiao-Hwa Chen
Abstract—Key management has become a challenging issue in
the design and deployment of secure wireless sensor networks.
A common assumption in most existing distributed key manage-
ment schemes is that all sensor nodes have the same capability.
However, recent research works have suggested that connectivity
and lifetime of a sensor network can be substantially improved if
some nodes are given greater power and transmission capability.
Therefore, how to exploit those heterogeneity features in design
of a good distributed key management scheme has become an
important issue. This paper proposes a uniﬁed framework for
distributed key management schemes in heterogeneous wireless
sensor networks. Analytical models are developed to evaluate its
performance in terms of connectivity, reliability, and resilience.
Extensive simulation results show that, even with a small number
of heterogeneous nodes, the performance of a wireless sensor
network can be improved substantially. It is also shown that
our analytical models can be used to accurately predict the per-
formance of wireless sensor networks under varying conditions.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, heterogeneous, key
management.
I. INTRODUCTION
R
ECENTLY wireless sensor networks have attracted much
attention due to its great potential to be used in various
applications, including surveillance, widespread environmental
monitoring, manufacturing and business asset management,
automation in the transportation, security, and health-care
industries. If compared to existing infrastructure-based net-
works, wireless sensor networks can virtually work in any
environment, especially those where wired connections are not
possible.
In general, wireless sensor networks consist of battery-
operated sensor devices with computing, data processing,
and communicating components. The ways the sensors are
deployed can either be in a controlled environment such as
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factories, homes, or hospitals, or in an uncontrolled environ-
ment such as disaster or hostile area, particularly battleﬁeld,
where monitoring and surveillance is crucial. Clearly, in the
uncontrolled and hostile environments, security for sensor
networks becomes extremely important.
It is a great challenge to implement security in wireless
sensor networks because of the nature of wireless communi-
cations, resource limitation on sensor nodes, size and density
of the networks, unknown topology prior to deployment, and
high risk of physical attacks to unattended sensors [1]. In some
deployment scenarios, sensor nodes need to operate under
adversarial conditions. To provide secure communications
for the wireless sensor networks, all messages have to be
encrypted and authenticated. Consequently, security solutions
for such applications depend very much on the use of strong
and efﬁcient key distribution mechanisms in uncontrolled
environments. Obviously, using a single shared key for the
whole wireless sensor network is not a good idea because an
adversary can easily obtain the key. Therefore, to implement
a fundamental security service, pair-wise key establishment
should be used, enabling secure communication among the
sensor nodes using cryptographic techniques.
However, due to resource constraints on sensor nodes, it
is not feasible for sensors to use traditional pair-wise key
establishment techniques such as public key cryptography
and key distribution center [2]. Instead, sensor nodes should
use pre-distributed keys directly, or use keying materials to
dynamically generate pair-wise keys. In such a case, the main
challenge is to ﬁnd an efﬁcient way of distributing keys and
keying materials to sensor nodes prior to deployment. In the
last few years, different pair-wise key distribution schemes
have been developed for peer-to-peer wireless sensor networks
[3]–[10] and hierarchical wireless sensor networks [11] [12].
In peer-to-peer wireless sensor networks, there is no ﬁxed
infrastructure, and network topology is not known prior to
deployment. Sensor nodes are usually randomly scattered all
over the target area. Once they are deployed, each sensor
node scans its radio coverage area to ﬁgure out its neighbors.
In hierarchical wireless sensor networks, there is a hierarchy
among the nodes based on their capabilities: base stations
(or cluster supervisors) and sensor nodes [11] [12]. The base
stations can be much more powerful than the sensor nodes
in terms of transmission range, data processing capability,
storage capacity, and tamper-resistance. Base stations can form
the backbone of the sensor network and sensor nodes can
be deployed around single- or multi-hop neighborhood of the
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base stations. In general, the base stations are also the key
distribution centers in the sensor networks because they are
assumed to be tamper-resistant.
All aforementioned solutions for a distributed wireless sen-
sor network assumed that the sensor nodes are homogeneous
with the same capabilities. For the solutions of hierarchical
wireless sensor networks, except the base stations (or cluster
supervisors), the rest of the sensor nodes are homogeneous
with the same capabilities within each cluster.
However, heterogeneous sensor networks are given more
attention recently. Particularly, with the advances in antenna
technologies like multiple-input-multi-output (MIMO) sys-
tems [13], directional antennas [14], and cooperative com-
munications [15], the heterogeneity in terms of transmission
range in wireless sensor nodes has become a reality. Recent
studies also showed that such heterogeneity can improve net-
work performance and network lifetime without signiﬁcantly
increasing the cost [16]. Although it has been proven in [16]
that optimal deployment of the heterogeneity is very hard in
general, it showed that only a modest number of reliable, long-
range backhaul links and line-powered nodes are enough to
exert a signiﬁcant impact on the overall performance.
In this paper, we propose a framework for key management
schemes in distributed peer-to-peer wireless sensor networks
with heterogeneous sensor nodes. With the heterogeneous
sensor deployment schemes and key distribution mechanisms,
we will investigate the effect of heterogeneity for different key
management schemes on distributed wireless sensor networks.
We will show using simulations as well as analysis that, with
a small percentage of powerful nodes that have reasonable
storage, processing, and communication capabilities, a wire-
less sensor network can achieve higher key connectivity and
higher resilience.
The paper can be outlined as follows. We ﬁrst introduce
the major technical aspects of all key distribution schemes
in Section II. The description of the framework for key
management schemes in heterogeneous distributed wireless
sensor networks is given in Section III, in which some special
cases are also discussed. We then develop analytical models
for these schemes in Section IV. The numerical results and
discussions are presented in Section V. Finally, the conclusion
of the paper is drawn in Section VI.
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED WORKS
A. Security Requirements
In a wireless sensor network, physical security of wireless
links is virtually impossible because of the broadcast nature
and resource limitation on sensor nodes and uncontrolled
environments where they are left unattended. Consequently,
security attacks on information ﬂow can be widespread, e.g.,
passive interception of data transmission, active injection of
trafﬁc, and overloading the network with garbage packets.
Modiﬁcation of information is possible because of the nature
of the wireless channels and uncontrolled node environments.
An opponent can make use of these natural impairments to
modify information and also render the information unavail-
able. Security requirements in wireless sensor networks are
similar to those of wireless ad-hoc networks due to their
similarities [1]. Thus, wireless sensor networks also have
the general security requirements of availability, integrity,
authentication, conﬁdentiality and non-repudiation. These se-
curity requirements can be provided by a key distribution
mechanism with the requirements of scalability, efﬁciency,
key connectivity, and resilience. Scalability is the ability to
support large sensor nodes in the networks. Key distribution
mechanism must support large network, and must be ﬂexible
against substantial increase in the size of the network even
after deployment. Efﬁciency is the consideration of storage,
processing and communication limitations on sensor nodes.
Key connectivity is the probability that two or more sensor
nodes store the same key or keying material. Enough key
connectivity must be provided for a wireless sensor network
to perform its intended functionality. Resilience is about the
resistance against node capture. Compromise of security cre-
dentials, which are stored on a sensor node or exchanged over
radio links, should not reveal information about security of
any other links in a wireless sensor network. Higher resilience
means lower number of compromised links.
B. Related Works
In the last few years, many pair-wise key distribution
schemes have been developed for peer-to-peer wireless sensor
networks [3]–[10] and hierarchical wireless sensor networks
[11] [12]. Solutions to key distribution problem in wireless
sensor networks can use one of the three approaches: random,
deterministic, or hybrid [1]. In the random solutions, key-
chains are randomly selected from a key-pool and distributed
to sensor nodes. In the deterministic solutions, deterministic
processes are used to design the key-pool and the key-chains
to provide better key connectivity. The hybrid solutions use
random approaches on deterministic solutions to improve the
scalability and resilience.
Eschenauer and Gligor [3] proposed a random key pre-
distribution scheme for pair-wise key establishment in peer-
to-peer wireless sensor networks. The main idea in [3] is to let
each sensor node randomly pick up a set of keys from a key
pool before deployment so any pair of sensor nodes have a
certain probability of sharing at least one common key. Chan
et al. [4] further extended this idea and developed two key
pre-distribution techniques: q-composite key pre-distribution
and random pair-wise keys scheme. The q-composite key pre-
distribution also uses a key pool but requires two sensors to
compute a pair-wise key from at least q pre-distributed keys
they share. The random pair-wise keys scheme randomly picks
pairs of sensors and assigns each pair a unique random key.
In [5], Blundo et al. proposed to use bivariate polynomials
to achieve key distribution for dynamic conferences. To estab-
lish a pair-wise key between two nodes, the key setup server
randomly generates a t-degree bivariate polynomial as
f(x,y)=
t 
i,j=0
aijxiyj (1)
over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, where q is a predetermined prime number
that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key. By
choosing appropriate coefﬁcients aij = aji, we can have the
desired symmetric property, f(x,y)=f(y,x). Assume that
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each sensor node has a unique non-zero integer ID. For a pair
of sensor nodes ni and nj (ni and nj are unique sensor node
IDs), we can assign a polynomial share f(ni,y) to ni and
another share f(nj,y) to nj. After deployment, both nodes
need to broadcast their IDs to establish a pair-wise key. Then
node ni can compute f(ni,n j) by evaluating f(ni,y) at point
y = nj, and node nj can compute f(nj,n i) by evaluating
f(nj,y) at point y = ni. Due to the symmetry of the bivariate
polynomial, the secure pair-wise key between nodes ni and nj
is established as Kij = f(ni,n j)=f(nj,n i). The security
proof in [5] ensures that this scheme is unconditionally secure
and t-collusion resistant. That is, the coalition of no more
than t compromised sensor nodes knows nothing about the
pair-wise key between any two non-compromised nodes.
The polynomial based key pre-distribution scheme in [5]
has some limitations. In particular, it can only tolerate no more
than t compromised nodes, where the value of t is limited by
the memory available in sensor nodes. The larger a sensor
network is, the more likely an adversary compromises more
than t sensor nodes and then the entire network. To improve
this, Liu and Ning [6] developed a framework for pair-wise
key establishment based on the polynomial-based key pre-
distribution protocol in [5] and random key distribution in [3],
[4]. They further developed two pair-wise key pre-distribution
schemes: a random subset assignment scheme and a grid-based
key pre-distribution scheme.
Du et al. [7] proposed a key pre-distribution scheme with
the objective to improve the resilience of the network if
compared to the previous schemes. In [8], Du et al. proposed
another scheme to utilize node deployment knowledge to
improve the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme in [3] in terms of
network connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience
against node compromise. Their scheme assumes a group-
based deployment model, in which sensor nodes are deployed
in groups around their deployment points and the distribution
of deployment points follows a rectangular grid model. In
each group, the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme is applied. Zhou et
al. [9] presented a location-based key establishment scheme,
which is a hexagonal-grid-based deployment model combined
with a polynomial-based key establishment model to establish
a key between two neighboring nodes. In [10], the authors
considered the problem of designing a clustered distributed
sensor network when the probability of node compromise in
different deployment regions is known a prior.
For hierarchical wireless sensor networks, base stations (or
supervisor nodes) act like key distribution centers. Initially,
base stations may share a distinct pair-wise master-key with
each sensor nodes within a cluster. These master-keys can
then be used to establish other secure keys. In hierarchical
wireless sensor networks, pair-wise keys are required for the
communications between a base station and sensor node, and
between two sensor nodes. The requirement can be easily
resolved if a base station shares a distinct pair-wise master-
key with each sensor node [1]. In such a scenario, the base
station can intermediate the establishment of a pair-wise key
between any pair of sensor nodes. Law et al. [11] used
a similar approach where sensor nodes are separated into
domains that are supervised by cluster supervisors. Zhu et al.
[12] proposed localized encryption and authentication protocol
(LEAP), where each sensor node can establish pair-wise keys
with its one-hop neighbor. Multi-hop pair-wise keys may be
required to reach cluster heads, and it can be done by each
node generating a secret key and ﬁnding m intermediate
nodes. For the LEAP solution, security of the system depends
on the master-key the nodes received in the setup phase.
All aforementioned key management schemes for hierarchi-
cal wireless sensor networks have the underlying assumption
that the sensor nodes are tamper proof and the master-key
which is stored inside each node cannot be retrieved by an
adversary. However, the assumption that the nodes are tamper-
proof cannot be ensured in many sensor networks because sen-
sor nodes are usually left unattended in a hostile environment.
Once the master-key has been hacked, the adversary can use
it to break the security of the entire network.
III. DISTRIBUTED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
A. The Framework
In this paper, we propose a general framework for key
management schemes in distributed peer-to-peer wireless sen-
sor networks that consist of heterogeneous sensor nodes. The
framework can be described in terms of the following factors.
1) Classes of Nodes: In this framework, we consider that
there are I classes of sensor nodes in the network, with
Class 1 being the least powerful nodes, and Class I the
most powerful nodes, in terms of their communication range,
node processing capability, and energy level. Particularly, in
terms of communication range, we assume bi-directional link
between any two nodes. Let ri denote the communication
range of Class i nodes, we always have rm <r n if m<n .
Therefore, if a Class m node is within the range of direct
communication link of a Class n node, Class m node might
need multiple links to reach Class n node if m<n .T h e
sensor nodes are distributed heterogeneously in the wireless
sensor network, with pi being the percentage of Class i nodes,
and thus
p1 + p2 + ···+ pI =1 .
Here, it is important to note the fundamental difference
between the heterogeneous wireless sensor networks assumed
in this paper and the hierarchical wireless sensor networks
considered in [11] [12]. In the hierarchical wireless sensor net-
works, the base stations (or cluster supervisors) are centralized
nodes, and more importantly, they act like key distribution
centers. By contrast, in the heterogeneous wireless sensor
networks, except that the higher class nodes are more powerful
in terms of communication range, node capability, and energy
level, the communications between all different classes of
nodes is still on peer-to-peer basis and distributed.
2) Pair-Wise Key Establishment: Similar to previous stud-
ies [3], we also consider that there are three steps in the frame-
work to establish pair-wise keys between the sensor nodes: (a)
initialization, (b) direct key setup, and (c) (optional) path key
setup. The initialization step is performed in a key setup center
before the deployment of all the sensor nodes. In this step, the
setup server is responsible for distributing polynomial shares
to different sensor nodes; and the heterogeneity will be taken
into account in this process. The direct key setup step is for
any two nodes trying to establish a pair-wise key; and they
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always ﬁrst attempt to do so through direct key establishment
in a peer-to-peer manner. If the second step is successful,
there is no need to start the third step. Otherwise, these sensor
nodes may start path key setup step, trying to establish a pair-
wise key with the help of other sensors. Depending on the
heterogeneity, the third step can be disabled.
3) Key Generation: The general framework for key gener-
ation in heterogeneous distributed wireless sensor networks
is based on the random key distribution [3] [4] and the
polynomial based key pre-distribution protocol [5], and is
inspired by the approaches found in [6]. In particular, our
framework uses a pool of randomly generated bivariate poly-
nomials to establish pair-wise keys between sensor nodes, with
the consideration of I Classes of heterogeneity among the
wireless sensor nodes.
In this manner, existing distributed key management
schemes can all be included in the framework. To better un-
derstand the possible schemes, we let S be the total number of
polynomials in the pool. Consequently, existing and potential
schemes can be listed as the following:
￿ Category 1: I =1 , S>1, the degree of every polynomial
share is 0. In this case, the network is homogeneous and
the key distribution scheme degenerates to the traditional
key-pool based scheme [3], [4].
￿ Category 2: I =1 , S =1 , the degree of the polynomial
share is larger than 0. In this case, the network is
homogeneous and the key distribution scheme becomes
a polynomial based scheme [5].
￿ Category 3: I =1 , S>1, the degree of every polynomial
share is larger than 0. In this case, the network is still
homogeneous and the key distribution scheme is the
polynomial-pool based scheme [6].
￿ Category 4: I>1, S>1, the degree of every polynomial
share is 0. In this case, the network is heterogeneous and
the key distribution scheme is a key-pool based scheme.
￿ Category 5: I>1, S>1, the degree of all polyno-
mial shares are larger than 0. In this case, the network
is heterogeneous and the key distribution scheme is a
polynomial-pool based scheme.
Clearly, both Category 4 and Category 5 have there pros and
cons. In particular, compared to the key-pool based scheme,
the polynomial-pool based scheme may be more resilient and
require less memory storage as well as communication over-
head, it does require additional computational capability in the
sensor nodes to calculate polynomials and thus may increase
the energy consumption of the operation. Nevertheless, we
notice that both of these two schemes can be included in our
framework.
B. The Main Challenge
The main challenge in this framework is how to assign
polynomial shares to different classes of nodes. To address
this issue, we ﬁrst formulate the problem as described in the
following procedures.
1) In the ﬁrst step, classes of sensor nodes can be further
partitioned into J groups, where a unique group ID j
will be assigned to each group. With the deﬁnition of
group, our framework becomes more general, or in other
words can include existing or potential location-based
key distribution schemes [8]–[10]. In this step, different
sensor node deployment options can be considered, such
as square-grid [8], hexagonal-grid [9], or probabilistic
deployment scheme with a random distribution [10].
2) In the second step, the setup server will generate a set
of polynomials for each class of nodes. Speciﬁcally, for
class i (i =1 ,2,···,I), the setup server randomly
generates a set, denoted as Fi, of bivariate ti-degree
polynomials over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fqi, where qi is a large
prime number. In this procedure, the setup server can
assign each polynomial a unique ID.
3) In the third step, a set of polynomials, denoted as
Fij, can be created for nodes in class i and group j.
Particularly, we let
Fij =
i 
k=1
Fij(k), (2)
where Fij(k) (Fij(k) ⊆ Fk) is a subset of polynomials
that are selected from Fk. We can see from Eq. (2) that,
within group j, two classes i1 and i2 (i1 <i 2) will be
able to share some common polynomials if there exists
a k (k ≤ i1 <i 2) such that
Fi1j(k)

Fi2j(k)  = ∅. (3)
Similarly, for the same class i, nodes in two different
groups j1  = j2 will be able to share common polyno-
mials if there exists a k (k ≤ i) such that
Fij1(k)

Fij2(k)  = ∅. (4)
4) In the fourth step, the setup server picks up a subset of
polynomials, denoted as Φn
ij (Φn
ij ⊆ Fij) for a node n in
class i and group j, and assigns the polynomial shares
of these polynomials to the node.
From the above discussion, we can clearly observe that the
major issue in our framework is the subset assignment prob-
lem, which speciﬁes how to determine the set of polynomials
Fij and how to assign the polynomial shared by sensor nodes
in group j with class i. During the key distribution procedure,
some factors must be considered, including the probability that
adjacent nodes can share a common key, the resilience of the
network when it is under attack, and importantly, the nature
of the heterogeneity.
C. Key Distribution Schemes
From the description above, we observe that the new key
generation scheme in our framework is essentially different
to all existing schemes. Particularly that in our proposed
scheme, heterogeneity features can be taken into account. Let
us consider a typical heterogeneous wireless sensor network
that is established to collect data in a distributed scenario. In
this case, a sensor node should submit its observation to a
sink node (or sink nodes, depending on the conﬁguration of
the network) through the network in a hop-by-hop manner,
as shown in Fig. 1 (a), where there are two types of sensor
nodes.
Since the higher class nodes have a larger transmission
range, it is natural that a low class node will tend to utilize
Authorized licensed use limited to: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. Downloaded on August 26, 2009 at 02:21 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. LU et al.: A FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRIBUTED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME IN HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 643
C
Sink Node
Class 1 node
Class 2 node
A
B
(a) An example for wireless sensor network
Class 2 node Y
Z
X
A
K1
K2, K3
K1, K4
Class 1 node
(b) An example for the proposed scheme
Fig. 1. Examples of wireless sensor networks and the proposed key
management scheme.
the link between itself and a high class node to submit the
observations. For example, in Fig. 1 (a), Class 1 node A will
tend to use the path ”A-B-C-Sink” to submit its report, instead
of passing the message by Class 1 nodes (the dash line).
Evidently, a high class node will more likely be chosen as
the next-hop neighbor of nearby low class nodes to forward
data. Consequently, in this heterogeneous sensor network, the
connectivity between a low class node and a high class node
will be more important than the connectivity between two low
class nodes.
We now design two special key distribution schemes within
the new framework for the above scenario. Speciﬁcally, we
consider that there are only two classes of the heterogeneous
sensor nodes, i.e., I =2 . To simplify the illustration, we also
assume that there is only one group, denoted as group 0, in
the network.
The ﬁrst scheme is a key-pool based key distribution
scheme that belongs to Category 4 in Section III.A.3 and the
second one is a polynomial-pool based scheme that belongs to
Category 5 in Section III.A.3. For both schemes, we denote C1
as the class of the less powerful sensor nodes, and denote C2
the class of the more powerful sensor nodes. For both cases,
we ﬁrst deﬁne that a C2 node is in the neighborhood of a C1
node if this C1 node can directly receive a broadcast message
from the C2 node. In other words, the C1 node can receive
the key (polynomial) pool information of the C2 node without
the relay of other sensor nodes. To simplify the discussion,
we assume that a C1 node can transmit messages to any C2
nodes in its neighborhood, either through a one-hop link if the
distance between them is small enough, or through a multi-
hop path if the distance is larger than a threshold. In the latter
case, the message from one C1 node can still be secure if the
C1 node and the C2 node share at least one key, and all other
nodes in the path are not compromised.
An example of this scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 (b), where
node A is a C1 node and nodes X, Y , and Z are C2 nodes.
In this example, nodes X, Y , and Z are the only C2 neighbor
nodes of node A. In addition, node A shares key K1 with
node X, K2 and K3 with node Y , and K1 and K4 with
node Z, respectively. In this example, node A is connected
if q ≤ 4. In such a case, if node A wants to submit new
information to the sink node, it can ﬁrst randomly select a key
from K1 to K4, then it can randomly select a neighbor node
that shares the same key with it. In this manner, we can see
that the communication is more resilient, while maintaining
the connectivity.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, we develop analytical models to evaluate
the performance of the key management schemes within
the framework. Similar to the previous studies, probability
theoretical approach will be applied because the keys in each
node are randomly selected or randomly generated.
A. Connectivity for Polynomial-Pool Based Scheme
In this case, we consider the polynomial-pool based key
management scheme discussed in the previous section. It is
noted that the degree of polynomial in general is greater than
one, and thus the same polynomial can generate multiple keys
at different nodes. Therefore, the total number of keys that a
C1 node can share with all C2 nodes is the summation of the
number of shared polynomials between the C1 node and each
of the C2 nodes.
Based on this observation, we can ﬁrst calculate the prob-
ability that a C1 node shares i polynomials with a C2 node,
denoted as p(i).L e tS be the size of the polynomial pool,
and let P1 and P2 be the number of polynomials that can be
stored in a C1 node and in a C2 node, respectively. We can
directly derive p(i) as follows
p(i)=

S
i

S − i
P1 − i

S − P1
P2 − i


S
P1

S
P2
 (5)
With p(i), we can derive the distribution that the total number
of shared keys between a C1 node and n2 C2 nodes as
pn2(i)=p(i) ⊗ p(i) ⊗···⊗p(i)
 	 

n2
, (6)
where ⊗ denotes convolution operation. Finally, the connec-
tivity for the polynomial-pool based key management scheme
can be achieved by
Cp(q)=1−
q−1 
i=0
pn2(i). (7)
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B. Connectivity for Key-Pool Based Scheme
In this case, a key that is shared by one C1 node and
multiple C2 nodes will be considered as one key. To take
such effect into account, we ﬁrst let vn(i) be the probability
that a C1 node shares i different keys with nC 2 nodes. Now
let K1 and K2 be the number of keys that can be stored in
a C1 node and in a C2 node, respectively. Similar to Eq. (5),
we have
v1(i)=

S
i

S − i
K1 − i

S − K1
K2 − i


S
K1

S
K2
 (8)
To calculate vn(i) (n>1), we can utilize the following
recursive algorithm
vn(i)=
i 
j=0
vn−1(j)h(i − j|j),n>0 (9)
where hn−1(i − j|j) is the conditional probability that a C1
node can share (i−j) keys with a C2 node, given that it shares
j keys (different from the i − j keys) with other C2 nodes.
Clearly, h(i − j|j) does not depend on the number of C2
nodes, and it can be calculated by
h(i − j|j)=

S − j
i − j

S − i
K1 − i

S − K1 + j
K2 − i + j


S − j
K1 − j

S
K2
 (10)
Finally, the connectivity for the key-pool based key manage-
ment scheme can be obtained by
Ck(q)=1−
q−1 
i=0
vn2(i), (11)
where n2 is the total number of C2 nodes in the neighborhood
of a C1 node.
C. Resilience of the Key-Pool Based Scheme
In this case, we consider the performance of the key-pool
based scheme when some C1 nodes are compromised. We
consider two scenarios: 1) the compromised nodes can be
identiﬁed; and 2) the compromised nodes cannot be detected.
In the ﬁrst scenario, we analyze the connectivity of the
normal nodes after some C1 nodes are compromised and
all other nodes in the network recognize these compromised
nodes. Here, it is reasonable to assume that C2 nodes are
tamper-resistant. To conduct the analysis, we deﬁne qn(i) as
the probability that a C1 node shares i different keys with
neighboring C2 nodes, given that nC 1 nodes in the same
region have been captured. Let g(j−i|i) be the probability that
(j−i) keys are compromised when a C1 node is compromised,
given that j keys are available before the attack. We can then
derive a recursive algorithm to calculate qn(i) as follows.
q0(i)=vn2(i),∀0 ≤ i ≤ K1 (12)
qn(i)=
K1 
j=i
qn−1(j)g(j − i|j) (13)
where g(j − i|i) can be calculated by
g(j − i|j)=

j
j − i

S − j
K1 + i − j


S
K1
 (14)
In the second scenario, normal nodes in the network do not
notice that some C1 nodes have been compromised. Therefore,
a certain number of sessions will be eavesdropped. To evaluate
the performance, we use the ratio of unaffected trafﬁc to
describe the resilience behavior in such a scenario. Here, it
is important to note that, with the new schemes, a C1 node
can still transmit data securely to C2 nodes even if some of
the keys are compromised. For example, in Fig. 1, if K1 is
the only key that is compromised, then we can see that node
A still has 75% chance to forward the data to any one of the
C2 nodes (with K2, K3,o rK4).
To analyze the unaffected ratio, denoted as ρ(n), where n is
the number of compromised C1 nodes, we deﬁne r(i,j,n) as
the probability that j keys of a C1 node are not compromised,
given that in total i keys are shared by the C1 node and
neighboring C2 nodes and that n other C1 nodes have been
compromised. Clearly, we have
ρ(n)=
K1 
i=1
i 
j=1

vn2(i) × r(i,j,n) ×
j
i

(15)
In Eq. (15), vn2(i) can be calculated by Eq. (9) and r(i,j,n)
can be calculated recursively.
r(i,j,1) =

i
i − j

S − i
K1 − i + j


S
K1
 (16)
r(i,j,n)=
i 
k=j
r(i,k,n − 1)
 k
k−j
 S−k
K1−k+j


S
K1
 . (17)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the analytical and simulation re-
sults to compare the performance of different conﬁgurations of
key management schemes discussed in the previous sections.
The settings of our experiments can be summarized as follows.
￿ There are two classes of sensor nodes, denoted as C1 and
C2, in the network.
￿ We consider a small area of a sensor network, in which
the number of C1 nodes is 40 and the number of C2
nodes is N2.
￿ Each C1 node in the area can directly communicate with
all C2 nodes within the area.
￿ We investigate two key distribution schemes: (1) key-pool
based scheme, and (2) polynomial-pool based scheme.
￿ For each of the simulation runs, we test 1,000 small
sensor networks. Since each network has 40 C1 nodes,
the connectivity of 40,000 C1 nodes will be measured.
Other simulation settings can be found in Table. I.
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TABLE I
SIMULATION SETTINGS
Parameters Key-pool based scheme Polynomial-pool based scheme
Pool size S = 10000 S = 1000
N1 40 40
N2 To be investigated To be investigated
For C1 nodes K1: to be investigated P1: to be investigated
For C2 nodes K2 = 1000 P2 = 100
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Fig. 2. Connectivity vs. the number of keys in a C1 node (key-pool based
scheme, q =1 ).
A. Key Connectivity of the New Schemes in Normal Condi-
tions
Fig. 2 shows the connectivity versus the number of keys in
a C1 node with different number of C2 nodes for the key-pool
based scheme, where we assume q =1 . It can be observed
that, the connectivity can increase with the increase of the
number of keys. For a ﬁxed number of keys in each C1 node,
we can see that a small increase of the number of C2 nodes
can signiﬁcantly improve the connectivity, especially when the
number of keys in C1 node is small and medium. From another
perspective, we can see that, to achieve a speciﬁc connectivity,
the number of keys that must be stored in each C1 node can
be decreased with the increase of N2. For instance, if the
connectivity is 0.99, then about 45 keys are required for N2 =
1, about 23 keys are required for N2 =2 , and about 15 keys
are needed for N2 =3 .
To highlight the impact of C2 nodes, we illustrate in Fig. 3
the performance of connectivity versus the number of C2
nodes in the cluster with different values of q, where the
number of keys in any C1 node is 30. It can be clearly seen that
the network connectivity can be substantially improved when
the number of C2 nodes increases from 1 to 3. Interestingly,
the connectivity converges to 1 if N2 =3 , meaning that we
do not need to deploy more C2 nodes if the resilience is not
a concern.
In Figs. 4 and 5, the performance of the polynomial-pool
based key management scheme is illustrated. Fig. 4 shows the
connectivity versus the number of keys in a C1 node with
different numbers of C2 nodes for the polynomial-pool based
scheme, where we assume q =1 . Fig. 5 shows the connectivity
versus the number of C2 nodes with different values of q for
polynomial-pool based scheme. From Figs. 4 and 5, similar
trends can be observed as those of Figs. 2 and 3, meaning that
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Fig. 3. Connectivity vs. the number of C2 nodes (key-pool based scheme,
30 keys per C1 node).
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Fig. 4. Connectivity vs. the number of polynomials in a C1 node
(polynomial-pool based scheme, q =1 ).
only very few number of C2 nodes can signiﬁcantly improve
the system performance in both schemes.
B. Reliability of the New Schemes
From Figs. 3 and 5 it can also be concluded that the increase
of the number of C2 nodes can substantially improve the
reliability of the network. In particular, if we deploy 5 C2
nodes in the key-pool based scheme, the connectivity of the
C1 nodes can be maintained even if any two C2 nodes are
broken.
C. Resilience of the New Schemes
To evaluate the resilience of the new schemes, we evaluated
performance of a sensor network when some C1 nodes are
compromised. Here, it has to be noted that C2 nodes are
assumed to be more tamper-resistant. In Figs. 6 and 7, we
consider the key-pool based scheme, in which we let q =1and
the keys per C1 node will be selected such that the network
connectivity is 99% under normal conditions.
We ﬁrst investigate the connectivity of the remaining
uncompromised nodes, if the compromised nodes and the
corresponding keys can be identiﬁed after the capture of
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Fig. 6. Connectivity of uncompromised C1 nodes vs. the number of
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any C1 nodes. From Fig. 6 we can clearly observe that
the connectivity of the remaining nodes decreases with the
increasing number of compromised nodes. Nevertheless, it is
seen that the connectivity is relatively high even if 20 nodes
(amongst 40 nodes in total) are compromised. From Fig. 6
we can also observe that the connectivity can be improved
slightly if more than one C2 nodes are deployed.
In Fig. 7, we show the resilience of the scheme from another
perspective, in which it is assumed that the compromised C1
nodes cannot be detected. In such a scenario, the data trans-
mission from an unaffected C1 node may be eavesdropped
by a nearby compromised node. Therefore, it is important to
study the percentage of communications that are not affected.
In the previous discussion, we have seen that with the new
schemes a C1 node can still transmit data securely to C2 nodes
even if some of the keys are compromised. This phenomenon
can be clearly observed in Fig. 7, where a high percentage of
secured communications can still be maintained even if half
of the C1 nodes are compromised. Moreover, it is seen that
more C2 nodes can help to increase the fraction of unaffected
communications, given the same number of compromised C1
nodes.
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Fig. 7. Fraction of unaffected communications from uncompromised nodes
vs. the number of compromised C1 nodes (key-pool based scheme, q =1 ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a distributed key management
scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. Analyti-
cal models are developed to evaluate the performance of the
scheme in terms of connectivity, reliability, and resilience.
Extensive simulation results have shown that, even with a
small number of heterogeneous nodes, the key connectivity,
reliability, and resilience of a wireless sensor network can
be improved effectively. It is also shown that the proposed
analytical models can be used to predict the performance
accurately under varying operational conditions.
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